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Abstract
Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition
constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters’ true concerns. In the real
world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues
selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should
allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute.
We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties
(i) invest to attract voters with “better” policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication
campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between
communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can
backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones
they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties
prefer to focus on their “historical issues” or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the
latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates
parties less.
Keywords: party strategy, salience, issue selection and ownership, priming.
JEL codes: D72, H11
1 Introduction
‘The critical difference among elections is the problem concern of the voters,
not their policy attitudes’ A. Petrocik
Electoral campaigns are characterized by a set of issues on which parties choose to
focus their communication. A puzzle is how and why parties select these specific issues.
Sometimes, like in the movie “Wag the dog”, issues seem to be fabricated to divert the
voters’ attention away from otherwise important problems. Typical such decoys include
immigration (raised e.g. by French President Sarkozy in 2011) or criminality (raised e.g.
by presidential candidate Bush in 1988). Yet, this diversion strategy is far from system-
atic. The exact opposite strategy may even be chosen: although illegal immigration was
perceived as “important” or “very important” by 60% of the voters prior to the 2008 pres-
idential campaign (Fortune magazine poll of January 2008), both candidates McCain and
Obama muted this issue. Similarly, although “drugs” was the most cited issue in August
1991 (Washington Post opinion poll), both Clinton and Bush muted it during the 1992
campaign.1 Also, and in contrast to common perceptions, the parties’ ownership of an issue
can be very unstable. Education and social security –traditionally Democratic issues– were
key elements in the campaign of Bush in 2000. The same holds for criminality: traditionally
a Republican issue, it turned out to be a major asset in Clinton’s 1996 campaign.2
Our analysis embeds the strategic selection of issues during the campaign into a broader
model in which parties can also invest resources to improve their policy proposals on each
potential issue. In this way, we develop a theory of endogenous issue ownership that allows
us to explain when and why there is issue specialization –i.e. parties keep focusing on the
issues in which they already have a reputation advantage– or issue stealing, as did Bush
and Clinton in the above examples. Our results identify novel feedback effects between the
parties’ capacity to manipulate voter attention towards specific issues during the campaign
and their incentives to invest resources, and possibly acquire ownership, in each issue prior
to the campaign. Two major effects stand out: the attention-shifting effect accords with
the standard intuition that, the more parties can manipulate voter attention, the more they
can soften political competition and increase their rents. In particular, it allows parties to
1The issue “drugs” being muted, it lost importance in opinion polls throughout the 1992 campaign.
This pattern prevails in most campaigns: muted issues lose salience, whereas the opposite happens for the
main campaign themes – we return to these “priming effects” below.
2Holian (2004) details “how the Clinton campaign and, in turn, the administration turned a long-time
Democratic weakness into a non-issue in 1992, and ultimately a rhetorical strength by the 1996 campaign”
(p97).
1
cut investment in the issues that are muted during the campaign. Yet, they also face a
countervailing force, the homogenization effect : the abler parties are at manipulating voter
attention, the more alike voters become. This increased homogeneity implies that more
voters get swung by a marginal improvement in any policy proposal. This traps parties
into investing more in all issues, which reinforces the competitiveness of the election.
These two effects combine with the parties’ initial reputation advantages to determine
the nature of the equilibrium. We focus on a symmetric situation in which each party, A
and B, has a reputation advantage on one issue, respectively a and b, and no advantage
on a neutral issue, c. This reputation advantage is best thought to depend on the party’s
historical performance on the issue, which Petrocik (1996) associates with “issue owner-
ship” (see below). Yet, we want to argue that what actually matters for voters are policy
proposals, not history. In our model, a reputation advantage reduces the party’s cost of
developing convincing proposals on the issue. What we find is that reputation advantages
need not translate into ownership in terms of realized proposals: this depends on whether
the equilibrium is associated with issue specialization or issue stealing.
Our model builds on several strands of the literature. The literature on priming explains
how the political campaign can influence the voters’ relative attention across issues, and
consequently their voting behavior. The priming effect hypothesis can be summarized by
Cohen’s (1963) observation that the media may not be successful in telling people what to
think, but they are stunningly successful in telling them what to think about. This claim
has both been validated empirically, among others by McCombs and Shaw (1972), and
experimentally (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1981, 1984; Iyengar et al. 1982; Iyengar
and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1990. For a critique, see also Lenz 2009). The priming effect
hypothesis relies on two related findings in the psychology literature. First, the more an
issue is emphasized in the media, the more accessible it becomes in the memory of an
individual. Second, the more an issue is accessible in the memory of an individual, the
more it dominates judgment, including in politics. In the context of an electoral campaign,
priming effects imply that voters attach larger weights to the issues that are emphasized
more.3
Knowing that they can build on such priming effects, parties develop an incentive to
emphasize issues selectively. Riker’s (1993) dominance and dispersion principles theorize
these incentives. They respectively state that (i) when one party dominates in the volume
3A question is which of the media or the parties control the information accessible to voters. Clearly,
priming effects are maximal when both the parties and the media decide to emphasize the same issues.
Yet, it was also found that the media reflect, rather than affect, the parties’ agenda (Brandeburg 2002)
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of rhetorical appeals on a particular issue, the other party abandons appeals on that issue;
(ii) when neither party dominates, both parties abandon the issue. Accordingly, each issue
is either raised by exactly one party or abandoned. While the Riker principles provide a
powerful explanation for why different parties focus on different issues, they do not specify
what gives a party the ability to dominate in its rhetorical appeals. Petrocik’s (1996) issue
ownership theory identifies ability with the parties’ reputation in handling each issue.4 An
implication, however, is that parties should seldom switch issues across elections. Petrocik
et al. (2004) admits that the issue ownership theory could not explain why, during the
2000 presidential campaign, the Republican Party was, for instance, airing many more ads
than the Democratic Party on the issue “education”, commonly thought as owned by the
Democrats.5
Yet, insisting on education was rational for Bush. The reason is that the Republican
Party, even if weaker in terms of reputation, had developed its novel No Child Left Behind
policy proposal. Not by chance, Bush’s 2000 electoral campaign began by explaining his
“vision to improve education”. Shortly after being published, the NCLB plan received high
support in the American electorate: according to Gallup Polls, 75% among the independent
voters and 50% among democrats said to be favorable to the plan. Encompassing the
possibility to develop novel proposals that go beyond a party’s historical reputation is one
of the building blocks of our theory.
To clarify the distinction between the parties’ investment that helps them reshape
their advantage on an issue, and the parties’ communication campaign that they use to
manipulate voter attention across issues, we separate the political game in distinct stages.
In the first stage, parties decide how much they invest in developing novel proposals for each
issue. This (costly) investment determines how voters compare the proposals of the two
parties within each issue. In Riker’s words, the party with the best proposal eventually
dominates the issue. In the second stage, parties choose their advertisement strategy
by strategically allocating campaigning time across issues. This allocation influences the
voters’ relative weighting of issues at the voting stage. In the third stage, having observed
the quality of each party’s proposals in each issue, and given her (manipulated) weighting
of issues, each voter casts her ballot for the party with the best overall platform.
Our results identify the feedback effects between these three stages. The parties’ deci-
4Many empirical works (see a.o. Sheafer & Weimann, 2005; Green & Hobolt, 2008; Belanger & Meguid,
2007) confirm that candidates generally focus on the issues on which they enjoy larger trust and found
significant priming effects.
5Such issue switching behaviour has been termed “issue trespassing” (Damore, 2004) or “issue stealing”
when trespassing is associated with a switch in dominance (Holian 2004, Sides 2006).
sion to specialize in the issues they “own” or to steal each other’s issues is found to depend
on how competitive the campaign gets, which in turn depends on the interactions between
the attention-shifting and homogenization effects identified above, and on the magnitude
of the parties’ reputation advantages. Issue specialization is associated with low degrees of
electoral competition which translates into positive rents for both parties. Surprisingly, this
equilibrium is generally reached when priming effects are low. In contrast, when priming
effects are stronger, competition stiffens, and parties must attack each other on all issues,
which generates issue stealing in equilibrium. The parties’ rents are minimal in that case.
We also find that lower costs of providing novel proposals on the neutral issue triggers
issue stealing in the other issues. The magnitude of the parties’ reputation advantages
has a monotonic effect on the competitiveness of the election: the larger are the parties’
reputation advantages, the more likely are low competition and issue specialization. The
reason is simply that beating the opponent on its own issues becomes too expensive. By
contrast, when comparative advantages are less important, the parties’ incentive to steal
each other’s issues becomes stronger. This is why issues like drugs or immigration may at
times be the central theme of the campaign (this happens when one party has acquired
a very strong advantage on the issue) or voluntarily muted (when the party’s reputation
advantage shrinks. This happened when drug policy was delegated to the White House
Office of National Drug Control Policy in 1989, and when Obama and McCain supported
the bipartisan McCain-Kennedy immigration bill in 2006).
Importantly, we find that the communication strategy chosen by the parties in the
second stage of the game actually always follows the Riker principles. That is, parties
always focus their communication on the issues that are best (or least damaging, depending
on the cases) ex post. By ex post, we mean that their initial investment produced an actual
advantage. What previous studies failed to identify is why ex post advantages may differ
from ex ante reputations. This, we find, depends on subtle interactions such as the ones
identified by our theory.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and discuss its
main assumptions. In Section 3, we focus on the voting stage and explain how voters
compare platforms. Section 4 presents the equilibrium analysis of the communication
stage, and Section 5 that of the policy quality stage. Both Sections 4 and 5 provide real-
world illustrations of our main results. Section 6 concludes and provides directions for
future research. The proofs that are not in the text can be found in the appendix.
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2 The Model
Two office-motivated parties, denoted by P ∈ {A,B} , compete for votes in an election.
For the sake of tractability, the policy space is restricted to three dimensions: each voter is
concerned by up to three issues k ∈ {a, b, c}. The electoral game has three stages: (1) each
party develops a manifesto with proposals about how to address each issue. A proposal is
identified by its quality, qPk . A platform is a vector of qualities: q
P ≡ ￿qPa , qPb , qPc ￿. (2)
Each party decides how much communication time tPk it devotes to each issue during the
electoral campaign.6 (3) On election day, each voter casts her ballot on the party with
the highest weighted average quality. As detailed below, a voter i is identified by her issue
weights, σik.
This setup contrasts with the classical Downsian approach to political competition,
which assumes that parties choose a position on a line. When applied to issue selection,
party locational choices would be driven by the party’s preferences over issues and by issue
divisiveness.7 We voluntarily abstract from such ideological cleavages and focus instead
on the quality of policy proposals. To put it differently, we focus on the common value
(vertical differentiation) rather than on the ideological valuation (horizontal differentiation)
of policies. Finally, our setup assumes symmetric information and full commitment: all
policy qualities are observable at the election stage and, when elected, a party actually
implements the policies developed at stage 1. This reduces the gap between pre- and post-
electoral considerations.
Stage 1: proposal quality. At stage 1, both parties simultaneously choose the quality
of their proposals on each issue, qPk . The investment cost of delivering a proposal of quality
qPk (≥ 0) is quadratic in quality and decreasing in the party’s reputation advantage on the
6The timing between stages 1 and 2 can be reversed or actions made simulateneous without affecting
any of the pure strategy equilibrium results. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, parties would always want
reoptimize their communication campaign in light of their realized relative performance on each issue. In
that case, the timing chosen in the model is the most meaningful.
7Amoros and Puy (2007) consider two ideological candidates who compete in two issues by allocating
an advertising budget. They show that either dialogue or issue-emphasis divergence may arise during a
political campaign. Colomer and Llavador (2011) propose a model in which parties must choose one issue
to push during the campaign, along with the Downsian position they defend. At the end of the campaign,
voters base their vote on exactly one issue as well. Glazer and Lohmann (1989), and Morelli and Van
Weelden (2011a and b) consider a framework in which working on ideological issues allows the incumbent
respectively to close an issue or to signal her type. They identify conditions under which parties overprovide
effort in divisive issues. Finally, Aragones and Sánchez-Pagés (2010) highlights how an incumbent faces
the emergence of an exogenously important issue, showing that for a high enough level of issue salience,
the incumbent forgoes reelection and guarantees to himself a good payoff in terms of policies during the
legislature.
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issue, θPk (≥ 0):
CPk
￿
qPk
￿
=
￿
qPk
￿2
θPk
.
Quality zero represents the status quo: a party investing zero on an issue cannot propose
any improvement over the status quo. Summing across issues, the total cost of drafting
the party manifesto is: CP
￿
qP
￿
=
￿
k(q
P
k )
2/θPk .
The parties’ reputation advantage can be interpreted as the party’s cost of committing
to increasingly precise proposals or the expertise and dedication of the party’s staff over an
issue.8 It implies that the parties’ ability to develop novel proposals typically differ across
issues. In particular, we assume that θAa > θBa and θAb < θ
B
b : party A is better at solving
problems on issue a and party B is better at solving problems on issue b. We also assume
that θAc = θBc : both parties are equally good at tackling issue c. Throughout, we focus on
the symmetric case, in which θ ≡ θAa = θBb > 1, θAb = θBa = 1 and θAc = θBc = θc ≥ 0. Notice
that we do not make any assumption on the value of θc, which can be zero (in which case
this issue disappears from the game), larger or smaller than 1, and larger or smaller than
θ.
Stage 2: the communication campaign. At the beginning of stage 2, parties observe
the quality of all six proposals (two parties times three issues) and simultaneously decide
the amount of campaigning time to spend in emphasizing each issue. Let tPk (≥ 0) denote
the amount of time or money that party P devotes to campaigning on issue k. Throughout
the campaign, the total amount of campaigning time devoted to issue k is:
tk = t
A
k + t
B
k .
Normalizing total campaigning time or advertising money to 1 and assuming that each
8A colleague in academia (who asks to remain anonymous) told us about his own experience in the US
Congress: each party assigns staff to different Congressional Committees. Typically, each party develops
more experience in, and assigns its best experts to, the committees that it considers a long-standing
priority. While the most powerful committees are always a priority for both parties, priorities can be
significantly different in other committees (or issues). Priority committees benefit from their more qualified
and motivated staff. Over time, parties thus end up with different skills on each issue. Our colleague worked
for the committee on Science, Space and Technology. This committee was considered a more important
priority for the Democratic than for the Republican party. As a result, and despite a smaller staff due
to their minority in Congress, Democrats became more active and drafted better proposals than the
Republicans on such scientific issues. In our model, investment is represented by the size and quality of
the staff, and the money spent on the issue, whereas θ can be seen as the accumulated expertise of the
available staff and Congressmen.
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party controls half of the total campaigning time, each party’s time constraint is:9
tA ≡
￿
k
tAk =
1
2
=
￿
k
tBk ≡ tB.
A communication strategy allows each party to set the agenda, that is, to affect the infor-
mational environment under which voters prioritize issues at the voting stage.
Stage 3: voting stage. At the beginning of stage 3, voters observe the quality of all
party proposals. A voter i is characterized by the eventual weights sik (≥ 0) she assigns to
issue k, with
￿
k s
i
k = 1. To identify which party she will support, voter i compares the
relative merits of each party’s proposal along each issue. She votes for party A iff:
￿
k
sik q
A
k ≥
￿
k
sik q
B
k , or￿
k
sik ∆k ≥ 0, with ∆k ≡ qAk − qBk , (1)
where ∆k is A’s quality advantage on issue k. Importantly, note that within each issue
every voter values quality in the same way: we abstract from the problem of ideological
divisions and positioning within issues. Ideology will be endogenous, and depend on the
matching between voter concerns and party proposals across issues.
The more an issue k is discussed during the campaign at stage 2, the higher will be the
voters’ weight sik assigned to this issue at the time of voting. The process that leads voters
to update beliefs when exposed to political communication has repeatedly been identified
by political psychologists among others and is known as priming (see the introduction for
more detail). Since our analysis does not aim at providing a theoretical rationale for the
priming process, we simply assume a reduced form to capture its effects.
Formally, prior to the electoral campaign, each voter has initial attention weights
σik (≥ 0), with
￿
k σ
i
k = 1. At the end of the campaign, her attention weights have be-
come:
sik = βtk + (1− β)σik. (2)
The posterior weight sik is thus a convex linear combination of the (party-controlled) cam-
paigning times tk spent on each issue, and of the voter’s prior weights σik. In that convex
combination, β is the relative influence of the electoral campaign and (1− β) that of the
9The model directly extends to endogenous campaigning budgets and advertisement times. When facing
identical fundraising opportunities, the outcome is always that the two parties choose the same allocation
of spending between quality and advertisement, which implies that tA = tB in equilibrium.
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prior. The parameter β thus captures the parties’ capacity to manipulate, or “prime”,
voters.
Party objectives and voter distribution. Each party thus has six control variables
(three quality choices and three campaigning time choices) to maximize its vote share net
of the investment costs:
ΠP (q, t) = V P (q, t)− CP (q) , (3)
where q ≡￿qAa , qAb , qAc , qBa , qBb , qBc ￿ and t ≡ {ta, tb, tc}. The vote share of A is the fraction
of voters who, given their weighting of the three issues, prefer the manifesto of A to that
of B:10
V A (q, t) =
￿
sia
￿
sib
1
￿
k
sik ∆k ≥ 0
￿
f
￿
sia, s
i
b, s
i
c
￿
dsibds
i
a, s.t. sic = 1− sia − sib (4)
The indicator function 1
￿￿
k s
i
k ∆k ≥ 0
￿
has value 1 when the voter prefers A to B in (1)
and 0 otherwise. Since there is no abstention in the model, we have V B = 1− V A.
The distribution of voter preferences over issue weights, si, is identified by the density
function fs, which depends on the distribution of ex-ante issue weights and on the political
campaign, t. We assume a uniform distribution of the ex-ante weights over the simplex of
admissible preferences:
Sσ ≡
￿￿
σia,σ
i
b,σ
i
c
￿
: σik ≥ 0,
￿
k
σik = 1
￿
(5)
The density of ex-ante weights within that simplex is therefore given by: fσ
￿
σia,σ
i
b,σ
i
c
￿
= 2,
∀ ￿σia,σib,σic￿ ∈ Sσ. Figure 1 illustrates this graphically.
However, as explained above, voters are primed by the parties’ communication cam-
paign (see (2)). From (5), it is straightforward to derive the set of admissible final weights,
Ss (t,β):
Ss (t,β) ≡
￿￿
sia, s
i
b, s
i
c
￿
: βtk ≤ sik ≤ βtk + 1− β, k = a, b, c
￿
,
which is a smaller triangle within the unit simplex. The size of this triangle is smaller
the larger is β. In other words, a consequence of more effective priming (higher β) is that
voters end up with more homogeneous final weights si than their initial preferences σi
would suggest. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
10Two interpretations are mathematically equivalent: either one imagines a winner-takes-it-all system.
The distribution of voters must then be understood as a random position of the pivotal voter. Or one
imagines a proportional representation system, in which case we can assume away aggregate uncertainty.
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σa=1
σb=1σc=1
Figure 1: Initial distribution of voters’ weights. The expected voter location is given by
the intersection between all the baricentric coordinates of the simplex.
σa
σb
E[Voter ex-ante]
E[Voter ex-post]
βtb βtb+1−β
βta
βta+1−β
Figure 2: Final distribution of voters’ weights: the expected voter location changes and
the density reduces.
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At the time of the election, the density of final weights has thus increased to fs
￿
sia, s
i
b, s
i
c
￿
=
2
(1−β)2 , ∀si ∈ Ss (t,β).
Equilibrium concept. We focus on the subgame perfect equilibria of this game: at stage
3, each voter casts her ballot on the party that maximizes her utility, given her posterior
weighting sik of each issue. At stage 2, each party chooses the communication strategy that
maximizes its vote share given the vector of qualities realized at stage 1. At stage 1, parties
choose the vector of qualities that maximize (3) given the expected advertisement strategy
at stage 2 and the voting behavior at stage 3.
3 The Voting Stage
By aggregating each voter’s decision rule (1), we can compute the aggregate vote share of
each party given their actions in stages 1 and 2. There are three cases to consider: in case
A, party A dominates B in all issues. In case B, B dominates. In case S, none of them
dominates, and the electorate will be Split.
Case A. Party A proposes a higher quality on each issue:
∆k ≥ 0, ∀k with at least one strict inequality.
In that case, all voters prefer A to B and A’s vote share is 1 independently of the parties’
communication strategies. In this case, a marginal increase in quality by A cannot increase
its vote share.
Case B. Party A proposes a lower quality on each issue:
∆k ≤ 0, ∀k with at least one strict inequality.
In that case, all voters prefer A to B and A’s vote share is 0. In this case, a marginal
decrease in quality by A cannot decrease its vote share, and the communication strategy
has still no effect.
Case S. None of the parties proposes a higher quality on all issues:
min
k
∆k < 0 < max
k
∆k.
While abstracting from potential entry by new parties, we follow the latter interpretation in the paper.
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In that case, a voter who assigns weight 1 to the former issue strictly prefers B to A, and
conversely for a voter who assigns weight 1 to the latter issue. This is the case for which
we need further calculations to derive each party’s vote share.
Let us focus for the time being on the most intuitive situation, in which A’s quality
advantage is positive and strongest in a, and that of B is positive and strongest in b:
∆a > 0,∆c > ∆b. By (1) , the vote share of A is the mass of voters for whom the weighted
average of quality differentials is larger than 0:
￿
k s
i
k ∆k ≥ 0. These are the voters who
value issue a sufficiently more than issue b. Indeed, exploiting the fact that
￿
k s
i
k = 1, (1)
can be re-written as:
sia [∆a −∆c] + sib [∆b −∆c] +∆c ≥ 0.
The voters who vote for A at stage 3 are therefore:￿
i : sia ≥ sib
∆c −∆b
∆a −∆c −
∆c
∆a −∆c
￿
. (6)
In other words, A and B voters are separated by a cutoff line. Importantly, parties can both
influence the position of this cutoff line –by varying their qualities– and the distribution
of the voters’s issue weights –by varying their advertisement times:
1. higher policy quality by party A and lower policy quality by party B always enlarges
the set (6) by moving the cutoff line “down” and “right” in Figure 3. Yet, policy
quality cannot affect the distribution of issue weights.
2. increasing the share of campaigning time dedicated to communicating about issue a
rather than issue b moves the distribution of issue weights “up” and “left” in Figure
4a. Figures 4b and c illustrate the effects of more communication time on issues b
and c respectively. In contrast with policy quality, communication cannot affect the
position of the cutoff line.
Combining these two effects, the vote share of A can be computed as:
V A =
￿ sa=1
sa=sb
∆c−∆b
∆a−∆c−
∆c
∆a−∆c
￿ sb=1
sb=0
fs (sa, sb) dsb dsa, (7)
where fs
￿
sia, s
i
b
￿
= 2
(1−β)2 for all sa ∈ [βta,βta + 1− β] and sb ∈ [βtb,βtb + 1− β] , sc =
1− sa − sb, and fs
￿
sia, s
i
b
￿
= 0 otherwise.
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sa
sb
V A
V B
sc
(a) ∆c increases
sa
sb
V A
V B
sc
(b) ∆b increases
Figure 3: The regular line, depicted for ∆a = −∆b and ∆c = 0.1, determines the vote
share of party A and B. On panel a, the dashed line describes the effect of an increase in
∆b. On panel b, the dashed line describes the effect of an increase in ∆c.
sa
sb
sc
(a) Issue a
sa
sb
sc
(b) Issue b
sa
sb
sc
(c) Issue c
Figure 4: Panel a, b and c shows the change in voters’ weights distribution. The black(gray)
point identifies the location of the expected voter after(before) the communication stage.
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Remark 1 The group of voters who support party A in (6) would actually turn to support-
ing party B if quality differentials were reversed. That is, the zones A and B in Figure 3
would be swapped. This means that, if si can be interpreted as a measure of voters’ proxim-
ity to parties, the base for a party actually depends on the policies that each party delivers
in each issue. Thus, whether or not the voting base of each party matches the parties’
initial reputation advantage will depend on the quality differentials in each issue.
Remark 2 If they invest the same (strictly positive) amount in each issue, parties main-
tain their initial advantage. On issue a for instance, party A delivers strictly higher policy
quality than B if both invest the same amount in that issue. Conversely, a party must
invest strictly more resources than its competitor to “steal” an issue from its competitor.
4 The Communication Stage
At stage 2, each party already crafted its proposals and quality costs are therefore sunk.
Parties observe qualities and choose a vector of campaigning times tPk : parties “prime” voters
by telling them “what this election is about”. Since quality costs are sunk, they maximize
their vote share (our results remain unchanged if parties must allocate an endogenous
advertising budget across issues). We study the problem of party A in Case S defined
above: in the other cases, communication does not affect vote shares. The analysis is
symmetric for party B.
Since tA = tB = 1/2, voters will be exposed to as many arguments from party A as
from party B. Consider the problem of party A: it chooses a vector tA (q) ≡ ￿tAa , tAb , tAc ￿
subject to its communication time constraint,
￿
k t
A
k = 1/2. Its purpose is to maximize its
vote share given the choice of qualities q made at stage 1. That is,
tA (q) = argmax
tA
V A
￿
q, tA, tB
￿
s.t. tAk ≥ 0 and
￿
k
tAk ≤ 1/2 for k ∈ {a, b, c} .
Remember that the communication strategy is meant to attract the voters’ attention
towards specific issue(s) – see (2). It is straightforward to check that each party maximizes
its vote share by concentrating all its campaigning time on a single issue, the one in which
its quality advantage is maximal:
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Proposition 1 Independently of β, each party concentrates all its campaigning time on
the issue in which it has the largest quality advantage. That is:
(ta (q) , tb (q) , tc (q)) =

(1/2, 1/2, 0) if ∆a > ∆c > ∆b or ∆a < ∆c < ∆b
(1/2, 0, 1/2) if ∆a > ∆b > ∆c or ∆a < ∆b < ∆c
(0, 1/2, 1/2) if ∆b > ∆a > ∆c or ∆b < ∆a < ∆c
(8)
where ∆k ≡ qAk − qBk for k ∈ {a, b, c}
To illustrate this result imagine that both A and B invested the same amount c¯ ≡
qPk /θ
P
k in all three issues, which implies that A (respectively B) has higher quality on a
(respectively b): qAa > qBa and qBb > q
A
b . This also implies that they tie on issue c: q
A
c = q
B
c .
Expressed in terms of quality differentials, we have: ∆a > 0 = ∆c > ∆b. From the first
line in (8) party A only wants to communicate on issue a, and party B only on issue b.
None of the parties brings up c, simply because both of them can attract more votes by
emphasizing their strong issue.
Good illustrations of this case might be the US presidential campaigns of 1992 and 2008:
in both campaigns, the Democratic candidate campaigned on domestic issues (Clinton
emphasized his proposals for a new covenant to America, and for reducing the gap between
rich and poor; Obama campaigned on his plans for a better social safety net) whereas the
Republican candidate campaigned on foreign issues (both Bush and McCain emphasized
their higher ability to combat foreign threats). In parallel, a historically relevant campaign
issue was muted during these campaigns: drugs in 1992 and immigration in 2008. In both
cases, the reason for muting this issue is that none of the candidates could build a strong
enough quality advantage on it before the election: the Office of National Drug Control
Policy was established in 1988. In 1992, both candidates were agreeing that the office’s
policy proposals should be followed. The situation on immigration in 2008 was similar: in
2005, the senators Ted Kennedy and John McCain jointly introduced the Secure America
and Orderly Immigration Act. This bipartisan effort can be seen as a prior investment in
quality by the Republican candidate. Obama’s proposals were neither clearly superior nor
inferior to McCain’s, which meant that none of the candidates could build a strong enough
advantage on this issue: both gained from muting it.
Note that this campaigning pattern does not depend on the absolute advantage of
each candidate: imagine that A invested even more on a in the first stage: qAa /θAa > c¯.
Then emphasizing a has a larger impact on its vote share. But this does not affect its best
response at the communication stage: it should still focus his communication campaign
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on issue a. Coming back to the electoral campaign of 1992, Bush kept campaigning on his
higher ability to fight foreign threats, even though it was becoming increasingly clear that
his success in the Iraq war would be insufficient to win the election.
Conversely, imagine that A invested enough on b to steal this issue from B: ∆b > 0.
The ranking of quality differentials is now ∆a > ∆b > ∆c = 0. In this case, A still has an
incentive only to communicate on a, since this is its strongest issue, but B’s best response
is modified: it should communicate only about issue c, since it is now its best option to
contain vote share losses. This is the second line in (8). Considering each possible (set of)
case(s), and discarding the non-generic outcomes in which ∆ is equal across two or more
issues, shows that only the three communication outcomes of Proposition 1 may emerge.
Which is this issue depends on the parties’ relative qualities which in turn depend on both
the parties’ comparative advantages and the amount each party has invested in each issue.
This result contrasts with the literature in which parties cannot control how much they
invest in each issue. Then, only history and past reputation may define a party’ strong
and weak issues in the current election. In our model instead, although it also depends
on past performance, policy quality and issue ownership are endogenous. The equilibrium
outcomes in terms of quality are analyzed in the next section.
5 The Quality Stage
We are now in a position to check how parties prepare their manifestos in anticipation of
the campaign: we turn to the first stage of the game, in which parties simultaneously select
how much they invest in platform quality.
There are up to three cases to consider (see Section 3): Case A is when ∆k > 0, ∀k. In
this case, A’s vote share is 1. Case B is when ∆k < 0, ∀k, and A’s vote share is 0. Case S
is when none of the parties dominates on all issues, and their vote shares take some value
between 0 and 1. We focus on Case S for the time being, and show that it yields a unique
candidate equilibrium in pure strategies. Cases A and B represent potential deviations
that may produce another equilibrium, in mixed strategies. They are analyzed in Sections
5.2 and 5.3.
In Case S, there is at least one issue k in which A proposes a strictly better policy
than B (that is: ∆k > 0) and at least one issue k￿ in which B’s policy is better than A’s
(that is: ∆k￿ < 0). We focus for now on the intuitive case in which A’s quality advantage
is positive and highest in a, and that of B is positive and highest in b: ∆a > 0 > ∆b and
∆a > ∆c > ∆b. We only detail the problem of party A; the analysis is identical for party
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B.
Party A chooses the vector of policy qualities that maximize its objective function (3)
given the anticipated equilibrium communication strategy of stage 2, tk (q), as identified
in Proposition 1, and the vote shares (7) that result. That is, it chooses a vector qA ≡￿
qAa , q
A
b , q
A
c
￿
such that:
qA = arg max
qAa ,q
A
b ,q
A
c
V A
￿
qA,qB; ta (q) , tb (q) , tc (q)
￿−￿￿qAk ￿2 /θAk
s.t. qAk ≥ 0 for k ∈ {a, b, c} .
This maximization problem is potentially intricate since the party must take into ac-
count how first-period quality choices influence second-period campaigning choices. Yet,
the nature of the best responses at the second stage simplifies this problem: the values tk
were shown to be constant within each of the three cases identified in Proposition 1. We
can thus focus on the simpler problem:
qA = arg max
qAa ,q
A
b ,q
A
c
V A
￿
qA,qB; t
￿−￿￿qAk ￿2 /θAk
s.t. qAk ≥ 0 for k ∈ {a, b, c} ,
in which advertisement times t are independent of q. Once the equilibrium quality choices
from stage 1 are identified, we shall identify which case(s) in (8) can actually materialize
in equilibrium.
As shown in Section 3, the vote share of A is the mass of voters who, given their
weighting of the three issues, value A’s proposals more than B’s:
￿
k s
i
k ∆k ≥ 0, where ∆k
denotes the quality differential in issue k, see (7). This implies that a marginal increase
in quality by party A or by party B have exactly opposite effects on the parties’ electoral
result. Hence, the two parties face equal marginal benefits of quality provision.
The difference between the parties thus only stems from their marginal costs, which
depend on their reputation advantage. The next proposition shows that, whenever a pure
strategy equilibrium exists, party A must propose higher-quality policies than party B in
issue a and conversely in issue b:
Proposition 2 In a pure strategy equilibrium we must have that qAa = θqBa , qBb = θq
A
b and
qAc = q
B
c . Therefore,
∆a = (θ − 1) qBa > ∆c = 0 > (1− θ) qAb = ∆b.
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By Proposition 1 this also implies that, in a pure strategy equilibrium, party A wants
to allocate all its campaigning time on issue a and party B only on issue b:
t∗ = (ta, tb, tc) = (1/2, 1/2, 0) .
5.1 The Homogenization and Attention-Shifting Effects
To derive the exact equilibrium levels of quality, we must identify the effects of the commu-
nication stage on quality provision. As shown in Figure 3, priming affects voting weights
in two different ways: first, the voters’ attention moves towards the more debated issues.
Second, voting weights become more homogeneous across voters. Here, we discuss the
impact of each of these effects on quality.
Since issue c is muted at the communication stage, voters eventually put less weight on
that issue than their prior weights σ suggest, and more weight on the other two issues, a
and b. As we show below, this effect induces parties to soften competition on the neutral
issue, which increases their rents. We call this phenomenon the attention-shifting effect
of the campaign. This is exactly the parties’ purpose: they want voters to focus on the
parties’ main strengths, and reduce investment costs on the issues that have less electoral
value.
The second, unintended, consequence of the campaign is that the voters’ attention
weights become more similar. Since voters are exposed to the same elements of information
during the campaign, the initial heterogeneity of voters’ attention weights gets reduced.
As a result, a marginal increase in quality in any issue can swing more voters at once.
This makes competition tougher in all issues. We call this the homogenization effect of the
campaign: Lemma 1 isolates the homogenization effect of quality provision by considering
the out-of-equilibrium campaign in which all issues are emphasized equally.
Lemma 1 For an exogenously set communication campaign t = {13 , 13 , 13}, all equilibrium
qualities would be monotonically increasing in β.
Thus, the more parties can manipulate the voters’ attention weights, the stiffer compe-
tition becomes. This homogenization effect implies that the parties’ incentive to produce
high-quality proposals increases in all issues. Yet, in equilibrium, only issues a and b are
emphasized, which triggers the attention-shifting effect, which provides additional incen-
tives to provide high quality proposals in issues a and b, but reduces the parties’ incentives
in issue c. The attention-shifting and homogenization effect thus have opposite effects on
quality provision for the neutral issue.
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How do these two effects eventually shape quality provision in the first stage? To-
gether, Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 show that this attention-shifting effect dominates
the homogenization effect on issue c:
Proposition 3 There is a unique candidate pure strategy equilibrium (PSE), in which
quality levels are:
qA,PSEa = q
B,PSE
b = θ
￿
1
8 (θ − 1)
1 + β
1− β
qB,PSEa = q
A,PSE
b =
￿
1
8 (θ − 1)
1 + β
1− β
qA,PSEc = q
B,PSE
c = θc
￿
1
2 (θ − 1)
1− β
1 + β
.
A PSE is thus necessarily symmetric, and such that all quality levels are strictly positive,
unless θc = 0.
Hence, there is a unique and symmetric potential equilibrium for Case S. A conse-
quence of these symmetric quality levels is that V A = V B = 1/2 whenever that equilibrium
exists. Within this candidate equilibrium, it is immediate to see that:
Corollary 1 In a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium:
(i) the attention-shifting effect dominates the homogenization effect in the neutral issue c
(qPc is strictly decreasing in β),
(ii) the stronger are priming effects, the higher is equilibrium quality in the other issues
(qPa and qPb are strictly increasing in β).
The other major ingredient that we want to emphasize is the influence of the ex-ante
reputation differences on equilibrium quality provision. From Proposition 3, it is immediate
to see that stronger reputation advantages (higher θ) tend to reduce quality provision in
both a party’s “weak” and “neutral” issues: qA,PSEb and q
A,PSE
c are strictly decreasing in
θ. On the other hand, the effect on a party’s strong issue is ambiguous. When θ is close
to one (comparative advantages are small), competition is very stiff, since the two parties
are almost interchangeable. Slightly increasing θ, parties invest less in all three issues:
competition is softened at the expense of voters. But when θ becomes sufficiently large
(larger than 2 in Figure 5), another effect dominates: each party can actually provide very
high quality proposals at low cost. In that case, quality provision is increasing in θ. The
following figure illustrates these effects for β = 1/3 and θc = 0.5.
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Figure 5: Policy Quality provided by party A’s in all issues as a function of θ, holding
β = 13 and θc =
1
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5.2 Issue Stealing
The above shows that there is a unique candidate for a pure strategy equilibrium. Yet,
to check whether these strategies are indeed an equilibrium, we must consider two addi-
tional deviations. We focus on party A: first, it may be tempted to steal all issues from
party B and deviate towards Case A. Second, party A may wish to deviate by cutting
down investment in all issues, and reach Case B. A necessary condition for the candidate
equilibrium of Proposition 3 to exist is therefore that these two potential deviations be
dominated. We first check whether party A has an incentive to deviate from the strategy
identified in Proposition 3 towards providing higher quality on all issues. The following
lemma establishes that we only need to consider one such deviation:
Lemma 2 Conditional on party A uniformly dominating party B (mink ∆k ≥ 0), party
A maximizes its objective function by setting qAa = qBa + εa, qAb = q
B
b and q
A
c = q
B
c + εc,
with εa, εc ≥ 0 and εa εc = 0.
Proof. For any
￿
qAa , q
A
b , q
A
c
￿
such that mink ∆k ≥ 0, the vote share of party A is 1. Therefore,
party A can only increase its payoff by reducing quality provision, subject to mink ∆k ≥ 0 and at
least one ∆k > 0.
We denote the quality levels derived in Lemma 2 with a superscript IS, for Issue Steal-
ing. The payoff of party A when it plays along the strategy derived in Proposition 3
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is:
ΠP
￿
qPSE , t
￿
= V A
￿
qPSE , t
￿−￿
k
￿
qP,PSEk
￿
θPk
2
=
1
2
− 1 + β
1− β
θ + 1
8 (θ − 1) −
1− β
1 + β
θc
2 (θ − 1) . (9)
Conversely, the payoff of party A when it deviates to
￿
qA,ISa , q
A,IS
b , q
A,IS
c
￿
=
￿
qBa , q
B
b , q
B
c
￿
is:
ΠA
￿
qA,IS ,qB,PSE
￿
= 1−
￿
1 + β
1− β
1
8 (θ − 1)
￿
1 + θ3
θ
− 1− β
1 + β
θc
2 (θ − 1) . (10)
The No issue stealing condition is that the former payoff is at least as large as the second
payoff. If it is satisfied, no party wants to undertake this deviation. Comparing these
payoffs, we find that:
Proposition 4 A necessary condition for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is
that the parties’ reputation advantage θ be sufficiently large:
θ2 − 1
4θ
≤ 1− β
1 + β
. (11)
Proof. Direct from the constraint that the payoff in (9) must be no smaller than (10) .
As can be seen from Proposition 3, equilibrium quality differentials ∆a = |∆b| =￿
(θ−1)
8
1+β
1−β are monotonously increasing both in the party’s reputation advantage θ and in
the effectiveness of priming β. When condition (11) is not satisfied, i.e. when parties are
insufficiently differentiated (θ is too close to 1), parties give up their reputation advantage
and compete “à la Bertrand” by trying to steal all issues from their competitor. To represent
this graphically, Figure 6 sets θc = 0, so that qPc = 0 in any equilibrium. PSE represents the
optimal quality for party A and NISC the optimal quality for party B in a PSE. To beat
party B on all issues, party A must deviate from PSE to any point in the area denoted
“V A = 1”. By Lemma 2, locating just to the right of NISC dominates any other point
in that area. The no-issue stealing condition is met in Figure 6a, because the parties’
comparative advantages is large (θ = 3) and priming effects are moderate (β = 0.4).
Heuristically, the points PSE and NISC are located sufficiently apart from one another.
Jumping from PSE to NISC is then too costly: the pure strategy equilibrium exists and is
the unique equilibrium. In Figure 6b, the parties’ comparative advantages is small (θ = 1.2
– β is still 0.4). Then, quality differentials are small, and issue stealing becomes cheap.
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Figure 6: In both panels, we fix θc = 0, so as to collapse one dimension, and β = 0.4.
In panel a, the differential in reputation advantages is high, and deviations from the pure
strategy equilibrium qualities (PSE) are too costly. In panel b, the differential in reputation
advantages is low and parties optimally deviate from PSE strategy.
The PSE does not exist in that case.
If it happens in equilibrium, issue-stealing has three important consequences. First, this
equilibrium cannot admit a pure strategy. It is relatively simple to check that the payoff
structure satisfies the conditions identified by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) to ensure the
existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium in that case. Thus, both parties must strictly
mix over the levels of quality provision in all issues. Our conjecture is that the equilibrium
is then similar to the one identified by Kovenock and Robertson (2010): party A should
propose strictly positive quality with probability one on a and c, and with a lower-than-
one probability on b. The strategy of B must be symmetric. Second, parties must earn
zero rents in equilibrium: if party A may expect strictly positive rents with some quality
level, then party B will want to deviate by slightly increasing its quality everywhere. This
process of ever-increasing quality stops when the cost of quality provision exceeds the
benefits of a higher vote share, i.e. when the expected vote share is equal to the total
costs of quality provision. Third, since the equilibrium is in mixed strategy, there is a
strictly positive probability that party A’s proposals are better than B’s on issue b, and
conversely on issue a. In other words, the parties’ initial advantage need not translate in
better proposals: the parties’ strong and weak issues may be reversed in comparison with
the pure strategy equilibrium and the issues that will be most debated during the campaign
cannot be perfectly anticipated at stage 1.
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5.3 Murphy’s Law of Campaigning
The second deviation to consider is whether party A prefers to cut down on costs and let
party B dominate on all issues, at the expense of a zero-vote share. Again, the following
lemma shows that we only need to consider one such deviation:
Lemma 3 Conditional on party B uniformly dominating party A (maxk ∆k ≤ 0), party
A maximizes its objective function by setting qAa = qAb = q
A
c = 0.
Proof. Party A’s vote share is always 0 in this case B. Cost minimization yields the result.
That is, the second deviation that party A must consider is akin to withdrawing from
the race, and earn zero surplus. This deviation increases the party’s surplus if the payoff
in (9) is negative. Checking when this payoff is non-negative, we identify the following
Murphy’s Law of Campaigning
Proposition 5 A necessary condition for the pure strategy equilibrium to exist is that
comparative advantages θ be large and priming effects β small: ΠP
￿
qPSE , t
￿ ≥ 0, iff
θ ≥ θ∗ (β, θc) ≡ 5− 3β
3− 5β +
4(1−β)2θc
(1+β)(3−5β) and β < 3/5 (12)
Proposition 5 sheds a different light on the effects of priming on political competition.
As seen in Proposition 4, the incentive to engage in issue stealing decreases when priming
becomes more effective. This accords well with the intuition that the parties’ ability to
manipulation voter attention (priming) allows the two parties to soften competition and
specialize in the issue that they typically own.
Proposition 5 instead shows that the aggregate effect of priming effectiveness can actu-
ally be the opposite. Within the pure strategy equilibrium, higher priming effectiveness, β
forces both parties to investment more in quality. This is the homogenization effect identi-
fied above. Party rents thus decrease and, by Proposition 5, the incentive to deviate from
the PSE by pulling out of the race increases.
Importantly, the incentive to pull out does not imply that competition gets softer over-
all: if a party pulls out, it becomes very cheap for the other party to dominate in all issues.
But, this implies that the former party now also has an incentive to deviate by slightly
increasing its investment levels in all issues, which affects the strategy of the second party,
and so on. In other words, we are back to the same kind of mixed strategy equilibrium as
under issue stealing. In other words, and paradoxically, the more voters can be manipu-
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Figure 7: Holding θc = 0 and 0 ≤ β < 0.6, the participation constraint is satisfied above
the x-marked curve while the no issue stealing condition is satisfied above the regular line.
lated, the more likely it is that the campaign will be competitive and unpredictable. This
is precisely what we mean by Murphy’s Law of Campaigning.
Figure 7 illustrates the combined effects of the two conditions (11) and (12) when
θc = 0.11 The PSE exists when the parameters (β, θ) lie above both curves on that figure.
That is, when comparative advantages are sufficiently large, and priming effects are not
too strong. In that equilibrium, competition is relatively soft, in the sense that parties
can earn strictly positive rents, and they do not engage in issue stealing. The main reason
being that parties are so different (comparative advantages are so large) that issue stealing
is too costly. When party differences fade away (i.e. θ → 1) or priming effects become too
large (i.e. β → 3/5), the equilibrium must be in strictly mixed strategies. In that case,
there is issue stealing and competition is so stiff that the parties’ expected rents fall to
zero.
Finally, observe that since 5−3β3−5β > 0 and
4(1−β)2
(1+β)(3−5β) ≥ 1 for all β > 0 we have that the
participation constraint can only be satisfied for values of θ that are larger than θc. Thus
there will be issue stealing (and zero rents) as soon as voters value more highly the parties’
proposals on issues that are unbiased rather than biased.
11The participation constraint moves upwards (i.e. becomes more binding) when θc increases above 0.
The reason is that, as parties become more productive on issue c, they must invest more in that issue, for
no additional vote in equilibrium.
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6 Conclusions
Even though issue ownership theory is well established in the literature on selection in
electoral campaigns, the stability of issue ownership remains an open question. In order
to give it an answer, we proposed a model that extends the issue-selection problem by
introducing an endogenous policy quality stage that combines the reputation differentials
of parties with their entrepreneurial effort in drafting their political platforms. We pro-
vide novel insights on the relation between the degree of competition and the stability of
issue ownership, and identify the precise effects of both the role of the parties’ reputation
advantage over issues and of priming in driving the degree of competition among parties.
While the role of priming in manipulating voters’ attention toward some issues was already
well-understood, to the very best of our knowledge, its effects on political competition had
never been identified.
The effects we identify are not always monotonic but three general and empirically
testable results emerge from our analysis. First, we find that the more asymmetric are
the parties’ reputations on some issues before the campaign, the more likely is issue spe-
cialization during the campaign. Parties then enjoy relatively high rents. Second, we find
that stiff competition and issue stealing during the campaign become more likely when
parties face high costs of providing innovative solutions for issues that are not owned by
any party (issue c in the model). Last and more surprisingly, stiff competition and issue
stealing is more likely when priming effects are strong. Parties then earn lower rents (zero
in the model). These results offer three new hypotheses that future research could test
empirically, namely: a negative correlation between the level of issue ownership and the
likelihood of issue stealing, a positive correlation between the parties’ costs of resolving
neutral issues and issue stealing, and a positive correlation between the intensity of the
priming effects and the likelihood of issue stealing.
In terms of welfare implications, our model is more limited. The rule that voters are
assumed to use in the model in order to decide their vote cannot be considered as a welfare
function, since it is affected by the voters’ weighting of issues, which are manipulable. While
political adverts have been found to effectively and significantly affect voting decisions, how
they affect the voters’ welfare after the election is another question. As a proxy for social
welfare, we can only use the quality levels of the policies produced by the parties before
the electoral campaign. Since our model relies on an assumption of full commitment,
the policies announced prior to the campaign are the ones that determine welfare. This
allows us to perform some welfare comparisons: issue stealing involves random investment
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levels, which must be high in expected terms. On average, issue stealing thus produces
higher-quality policies: parties need to be more creative and come up with new solutions
to traditional problems. Conversely, issue specialization implies lower investments overall
and larger party rents. Thus, on average, voters welfare should be expected to be higher
under an issue stealing equilibrium than under issue specialization.
One limitation of our model comes from the fact that it only considers valence issues,
and neglects divisive issues. We want to argue that our approach usefully complements
the analysis of divisive issues: the analysis led by Colomer and Llavador (2011) does not
allow parties to work on different issues at once, and neither Glazer and Lohmann (1989),
nor Morelli and Van Weelden (2011a and b) allow for the feedback effects between the
advertisement campaign and quality provision that we identify. Clearly, a model that
combines the intuitions of both approaches would be richer, but at the expense of a sig-
nificant increase in computational complexity. We also want to argue that a large part of
the effects of electoral campaigns are released through valence issues (such as the country’s
economic performance) rather than divisive issues. The argument is as follows. On the
one hand, divisive issues should be affecting more intensely the vote of partisan voters
rather than independent voters. This implies that our model is well suited to explain the
significant electoral swings that are observed across elections, as well as the parties’ choices
to switch across or to steal one another’s issues. As our examples illustrate, many of these
switches succeeded or failed because of a valence advantage accumulated by the parties.
On the other hand, since the political preferences of partisan voters are mostly determined
by their ideology, the effect of the electoral campaigns on their vote decision should be
much weaker than for independent voters. Yet, we believe that our model could also be
provide a better understanding of some voters’ partisan attachment, through the parties’
accumulated reputation over issues. We however leave this for future research.
Another limitation of the present analysis is the imposed symmetry of the model.
Allowing for asymmetric comparative advantages for parties or a multiplication of issues
would produce richer results. However, they would still stem from the same trade-offs
as those identified in the symmetric case. Similarly, relaxing the assumption of a uniform
distribution of the voters’ initial issue salience might make equilibrium results fit additional
stylized facts. For example, one could think that exogenous shocks increase or reduce the
salience weight of some issues. Then, the campaign would again become asymmetric,
depending on which party has a reputation advantage on the “shocked” issue.
Finally, the selection of issues during electoral campaigns also calls for further research
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about the threat of entry by single-issue parties. This would provide a useful starting point
to better analyze proportional elections.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the maximization problem for party A. In the second stage
of the game, party A’s FOCs are given by ∂Π
A
∂tAk
= ∂V
A
∂tAk
≥ 0 for k ∈ {a, b, c} . Maximizing the payoff
is therefore equivalent to maximizing the vote share. Suppose that ∆a > ∆c > ∆c. In that case,
the set of voters who cast their ballot for A is given by (6). To maximize its vote share, A must
therefore increase sia (ta) and reduce sib (tb), which is achieved by focusing all its advertisement
campaign on issue a, i.e. set tAa = 1/2. Conversely, party B should focus all its advertisement
campaign on issue b, i.e. set tBb = 1/2.
If instead ∆b > ∆a > ∆c, then party A’s vote share is decreasing in sia (ta) and increasing in
sib (tb). Hence, A must focus all its advertisement campaign on issue b, i.e. set: tAb = 1/2, whereas
party B should focus its campaign on issue a and set tBa = 1/2. Applying the same reasoning to
all possible rankings of ∆a, ∆b, and ∆c yields the proposition.
￿
Proof of proposition 2. Remember that the two parties’ payoffs are respectively:
ΠA
￿
qA,qB , tA, tB
￿
= V A
￿
qA,qB , tA, tB
￿−￿
k
￿
qAk
￿2
θAk
,
and:
ΠB
￿
qA,qB , tA, tB
￿
= 1− V A ￿qA,qB , tA, tB￿−￿
k
￿
qBk
￿
θBk
2
.
Moreover, θAa = θ
B
b ≡ θ > 1 ≡ θAb = θBa and θAc = θBc ≡ θc. It follows that the parties’ FOCs with
respect to qc are:
dΠA
dqAc
=
∂V A
∂∆c
· ∂∆c
∂qAc
− 2q
A
c
θc
=
∂V A
∂∆c
− 2q
A
c
θc
= 0,
dΠB
dqBc
=
∂V B
∂∆c
· ∂∆c
∂qBc
− 2q
B
c
θBa
= −∂V
A
∂∆c
(−1)− 2q
B
c
θc
= 0.
Thus, in equilibrium, qA
∗
c = q
B∗
c =
θc
2
∂V A
∂∆c
, which implies ∆c ≡ qAc − qBc = 0.
Similarly, the parties’ FOCs with respect to qa are:
dΠA
dqAa
=
∂V A
∂∆a
· ∂∆a
∂qAa
− 2q
A
a
θ
=
∂V A
∂∆a
− 2q
A
a
θ
= 0,
dΠB
dqBa
=
∂V B
∂∆a
· ∂∆a
∂qBa
− 2qBa = −
∂V A
∂∆a
(−1)− 2qBa = 0.
Thus, in equilibrium, qA
∗
a =
θ
2
∂V A
∂∆a
and qB
∗
a =
1
2
∂V A
∂∆a
, which implies qA
∗
a /q
B∗
a = θ. Recall that
θ > 1. Hence, ∆a ≡ qA∗a − qB
∗
a = (θ − 1) qB
∗
a > 0. Applying similar calculations to qb obtains
qB
∗
b =
1
2
∂V A
∂∆b
and qB
∗
b =
θ
2
∂V A
∂∆b
. Therefore, ∆b ≡ qA∗b − qB
∗
b = (1− θ) qB
∗
a < 0.
￿
Lemma 4 Let:
α ≡ ∆c −∆b
∆a −∆c (> 0) and γ ≡ −
∆c
∆a −∆c (13)
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V b
Figure 8: The vote share of B is given by the black area.
The parties’ vote shares can then be written as:
V A
￿
qA, qB , qC ; tA, tB
￿
=

1 if γ + αβtb ≤ βta − α (1− β)
1− [α(1−β)+γ+β(αtb−ta)]2
α(1+α)(1−β)2
if βta − α (1− β) ≤ γ + αβtb ≤ βta
[(1−β)−γ+β(αta−tb)]2
(1+α)(1−β)2
if βta ≤ γ + αβtb ≤ βta + 1− β
0 if γ + αβtb ≥ βta + 1− β
(14)
V B
￿
qA, qB , qC ; tA, tB
￿
= 1− V A ￿qA, qB , qC ; tA, tB￿
Proof. Using (1) and Proposition 2, all the voters whose weighting of issue a, denoted sia, is higher
than the value defined by the separating line:
sa (ta) = sb (tb) α+ γ (15)
will vote for A at stage 3.
In this proof, we focus on the case in which γ + αβtb ≤ βta, which is depicted in Figure 8.
We also impose that γ+αβtb is sufficiently large that V B (·) is strictly positive. Graphically, these
conditions imply that the separating line cuts the simplex “from below”.
The vote share of B is then the (strictly positive) mass of voters with sa (ta) ≤ γ + αsb (tb).
Knowing that the density of voters within the simplex Ss (t,β) is 2/ (1− β)2 , B’s vote share is
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defined by:
V B
￿
qA, qB , qC ; tA, tB
￿
=
￿ s1a
βta
K−sa￿
sa−γ
α
2
(1−β)2 dsbdsa, (16)
where: K ≡ β (ta + tb) + (1− β) is origin of the downward sloping line sa = K − sb in Figure 8
and s1a ≡ αK+γ1+α is the value of sa at the point of intersection between that line and the separating
line (15). Remark also that sa−γα is the inverse of the separating line. This integral represents
the surface of the triangle V B in Figure 8, multiplied by the density of the population within the
simplex.
Substituting for K and s1a in (16) and executing the integral yields:
V B (·) = [α(1−β)+γ+β(αtb−ta)]2
α(1+α)(1−β)2 . (17)
The second value of V A (·) in (14) is simply 1 − V B (·). The first, third, and fourth cases in (14)
are the values of V A (·) when the separating line respectively (i) passes entirely to the right of the
simplex, (ii) cuts the simplex “from the left” and (iii) passes entirely above the simplex.
Proof of Lemma 1: To prove the lemma, we use the vote shares that result from Lemma 4
(see above in this appendix) when tk = 1/3, ∀k ∈ {a, b, c}, solve for the equilibrium quality levels
that would result, differentiate them with respect to β.
Focusing on the same case as in Lemma 4, we have:
VB
￿
qA, qB , qC ; 13 ,
1
3
￿
= [α(1−β)+γ+β(α−1)/3]
2
α(1+α)(1−β)2 (18)
The first order conditions defining the optimal levels of quality are therefore: ∂VP∂α
∂α
∂qPk
+ ∂VP∂γ
∂γ
∂qPk
=
2qPk
θk
, where ∂VA∂x = −∂VB∂x for x = α, γ. Differentiating (18) yields:
∂VB
∂α
=
(1− 23β)(1−2γ)−(1+2α)( β/3−γα )
2
(1+α)2(1−β)2 , and
∂VB
∂γ
=
α+γ− β(1+2α)3
α(1+α)(1−β)2 .
Differentiating α and γ and substituting, we find that in equilibrium, qAb must be equal to qBa , and
hence that α = 1. From Proposition 2, we also have that γ = 0. After some manipulations, this
yields:
qAa /θ = q
B
a =
￿
4−(1+β)2
24(1−β)2(θ−1) = q
B
b /θ = q
A
b . (19)
This implies:
∂qAb
∂β
=
￿
(1− β)
￿
6 (θ − 1)
￿
4− (1 + β)2
￿￿−1
> 0.
Next, we have:
qAc =
2θc√
6
√
θ−1
β2−4β+3
(1−β)
√
3−2β−β2 .
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Differentiating and simplifying:
∂qAc
∂β
= 8βθc√
6
√
θ−1(3−2β−β2)3/2 > 0
￿
Proof of Proposition 3: To prove the proposition, we use the vote shares that result from
Lemma 4 (see above in this appendix) when ta = tb = 1/2, and tc = 0. Using the same reference
case as in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 4, we have:
V B
￿
qA,qB ; 12 ,
1
2
￿
= [α(1−β)+γ+β(α−1)/2]
2
α(1+α)(1−β)2 . (20)
Note that the only difference between (20) and (18) in the proof of Lemma 1 is that the last
term in the numerator is divided by 2 instead of 3. Derivations are thus similar and imply again
that α = 1 and γ = 0. In other words, any pure strategy equilibrium must be symmetric and such
that: qAa /θ = qBa = qBb /θ = qAb .
Using the equilibrium values of α and γ to simplify ∂V
A
∂α and
∂V A
∂γ yields:
∂V A
∂α
=− 1 + β
4 (1− β) (21)
and
∂V A
∂γ
=− 1
1− β . (22)
The proposition follows from substituting these values into the FOCs and finding that the solution
is unique.￿
Proof of Proposition 5: The participatory constraint is violated if ΠA (PSE) < 0. From
(9) , this imposes that:
1
2
− 1 + β
1− β
θ + 1
8 (θ − 1) −
1− β
1 + β
θc
2 (θ − 1) < 0.
After some manipulations, this yields:
θ (3− 5β) < 5− 3β + 4 (1−β)2(1+β) θc. (23)
This inequality always holds for β ≥ 35 . Conversely, for β < 35 , simplifying (23) yields Proposition
5.
Differentiating the condition with respect to β shows that θ∗ (β, θc) , which is the lowest level
of θ compatible with the PSE, is increasing in β if either β > 1/3 or θc < (1+β)
2
(1−β)(1−3β) . Under these
conditions, issue stealing is more likely the more parties can shift the voters’ attention towards
some issues.￿
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